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Class Actions to Remedy Mass Consumer
Wrongs: Repugnant Solution or
Controllable Genie? The Canadian
Experience
Jacob Ziegel*
I.

NATURE OF PROBLEM

From a Canadian perspective, by far the most important and
pressing problem facing postindustrial societies is not the adoption of
more consumer legislation but the non- or negligible enforcement of
existing laws. The problem is bad enough when it is experienced by
consumers with individual grievances, but it grows exponentially when
the wrong affects not just a handful of consumers but thousands of
consumers. Drawing on the Canadian experience, examples abound all
around us: false advertising, collusive price fixing, harmful drugs and
therapeutic devices, usurious interest rates, unlawful banking charges,
"vanishing premiums" in life insurance contracts, inflated prices for
automobile repairs, and other consumer services.

1I.

GOVERNMENTS AS PART OF THE PROBLEM, NOT THE SOLUTION

In Canada (and the same is surely true of other countries in the
Western hemisphere), there is no shortage of federal and provincial
consumer legislation. Much of it has been adopted over the past forty
years. Only rarely is the legislation accompanied by machinery for its
effective enforcement. Between 1960 and 1980, the federal government
in Canada and many of its provinces established new ministries and new
* Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Toronto. This short paper was
presented at the biennial conference of the International Academy of Commercial and
Consumer held in Bamberg, Germany, on August 1-3, 2008. This paper also retraces,
and updates, ground covered by me in an earlier publication. See Jacob Ziegel,
Consumer Class Actions in Canada and the Class Action Remedy, in LIBER AMICORUM
BERND STAUDER, DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION/KONSUMENTENRECHT/CONSUMER LAW

587 (Luc Thevenoz & Norbert Reich eds., Schulthess 2006).
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agencies whose ostensible purpose was to promote consumer interests
and to protect consumers against market abuses and wrongful practices.
Regrettably, these initiatives only had a short shelf life and, with modest
exceptions, the new ministries were later quietly closed down or merged
into other much larger government departments.1 The federal and
provincial governments were able to perform this vanishing trick because
consumers, as a pressure group, are notoriously unorganized and, unlike
most other economic interest groups, rarely wield significant political
power.
As a result-and again I speak largely from a Canadian
perspective-the consumer is left largely to his or her own devices.
Litigation in Canada is, for the most part, enormously expensive and
time consuming. Actions in Small Claims Courts, while provided for
under provincial law and not requiring the retention of lawyers,
nevertheless demand much patience and effort. Most consumers do not
find it worthwhile to expend the energy necessary to obtain redress for
smaller claims but prefer to take their lumps and learn from experience.
Various government agencies-federal, provincial, municipal-may
have the power to intervene but, for the most part, their resources, too,
are very limited and rarely extend to ensuring mass relief for consumers
adversely affected by the wrongful conduct.
Hence the question posed at the beginning of this paper. The
question is whether a solution can be wrought that addresses in scope and
effectiveness the magnitude of the problem where the wrong affects a
plurality of consumers. All developed societies have had to confront this
dilemma, and most still do. However, there is little consensus about the
right solution, even among members of the same legal family and with
similar economies. This paper concerns one of the much debated and
most controversial of the alternatives, the class action solution, which has
now been adopted in legislative form by all the provinces in Canada,
with the exception of Prince Edward Island, and by the federal
government in the form of amendments to the rules of procedure of the
Federal Court of Canada. By class action I mean a representative action
brought by one or more plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all other

1. Cf COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER SALES TRANSACTIONS: CASES, TEXT AND
MATERIALS 16-17 (Jacob S. Ziegel & Anthony J. Duggan eds., 4th ed. 2002) ("If it is

accurate to describe the 1960s and 1970s as the golden age of postwar consumerism, it
seems equally safe to predict that historians will record the 80s as largely a period of
consolidation and retrenchment and, in several provinces, even a period of
dismemberment of programs already in place.... [E]ven in its heyday there was often
more form than substance to governmental commitment to consumer protection.").
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members of the class seeking relief for a wrong alleged to have been
committed against them by the defendant. 2

III. COMMON LAW BACKGROUND
In common law jurisdictions, the class action remedy (then known
as a 'representative action') was actually developed by the English
Courts of Equity long before it also became available in the common law
courts. However, because Equity's remedial powers were limited to
cases where the Equity courts had jurisdiction, so was the scope of the
representative action. The future must have looked promising when the
common law courts and courts of equity were fused in England in 1873
and all the royal courts of justice were endowed with a full panoply of
remedies, including the power to award damages.
However, any expectations for an enlarged role for the
representative action were quickly dashed as it transpired that the post1873 courts had little sympathy for representative actions in which the
gist of the claim was for damages. In particular, in a leading case, Markt
& Co v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd., the English Court of Appeal held
that a representative action could not be brought in a claim for damages
based on breach of contract because the damages had to be separately
assessed for each member of the class. 3 In 1983, in another leading case,
Naken v. GeneralMotors of CanadaLtd., the Supreme Court of Canada
gave a broader explanation for rejecting representative claims seeking
damages by reasoning that the sparse rules of court governing
representative claims were quite inadequate to enable the courts to
handle such claims. In the Court's view, it was up to the provincial
2. There is a difference of opinion among judges in the few cases in which the issue
has been raised whether the legislation also permits class actions for declaratory
judgments. In one such recent action brought in Ontario the representative plaintiff
sought a declaration that an oath of allegiance to the Crown required of new Canadian
citizens was unconstitutional since it violated the class members' freedom of conscience
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Ontario court refused to strike
out the action as vexatious because the representative had previously litigated the same
action in a personal action brought by him against the federal government. However, the
court did not address the issue whether a declaratory action was admissible or appropriate
under the Ontario Class Proceedings Act. See Roach v. Canada, [2007] 86 O.R.3d 101
(Can.); cf A.L. v. Ontario (Minister of Community and Social Services), [2003] O.J.
2405 (O.S.C.J. June 16, 2003), rev'd on other grounds, Larcade v. Ontario (Minister of
Community and Social Services), [2005] O.J. 1924 (O.S.C.J. Div. Ct. May 13, 2005). In
L.A. v. Ontario, a class action seeking damages and a declaration that the defendants had
breached their statutory duties, Judge Cullity held inter alia that a class proceeding was
not the preferable procedure under the Ontario Class Proceedings Act and that the
members of the class could obtain adequate relief by bringing individual actions for a
declaration.
3. [1910] 2 K.B. 1021.
4. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 72 (Can.).
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legislatures to put meat on the bone if the Parliamentarians wanted
representative actions to be taken seriously.
IV. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

Canadian consumer advocates felt they knew what the appropriate
remedy should be because they were familiar with Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in the US and believed that a Canadian
counterpart could play the same beneficial role in Canada. Surprisingly,
it was Quebec, a civil law jurisdiction, which first adopted the class
action remedy (recours collectifs) in 1978 in its revised Code of Civil
Procedure. 5 The common law provinces did not join the band until 1992
when Ontario adopted its Class Proceedings Act (CPA).6 Since then all
the common law provinces, with the exception of Prince Edward Island
(Canada's smallest province), have enacted similar legislation.
V.

INFLUENCE OF THE OLRC REPORT

A major factor in Ontario's decision to adopt class action legislation
was the monumental three-volume report on Class Actions, produced by
the Ontario Law Reform Commission in 1982 ("The Report").7 The
Report was six years in the making, and has rightly been hailed as the
most thorough and carefully researched class actions report produced in
the Commonwealth.

The Report found that the existing remedies in

Ontario, with respect to mass wrongs, were seriously inadequate and that
well crafted and carefully considered class action legislation was the
right solution because it accomplished three key objectives. 8 First, it
promoted economic justice by providing a mechanism for the redress of

5. Art 999-1051, added by S. Que. 1978, c.8, s.3, as am. There are conflicting
theories explaining Quebec's pioneering role in introducing class action legislation in
Canada. Professor Glenn of McGill University has suggested that it was because,
although Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction in many respects, in the procedural sphere the
Quebec courts had adopted the common law model of litigation. H. Patrick Glenn, The
Dilemma of Class Action Reform, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 262, 262 (1986). Even if
Professor Glenn is correct about the common law influence, it does not explain why
Quebec adopted class action legislation long before the common law provinces did. A
better explanation offered to the author by Professor Ronald Macdonald, also of McGill
University, is that a strong social democratic government was in power in Quebec in the
late 1970s and that the decision to follow the Rule 23 model was based on ideological
grounds and had little to do with common law influences on Quebec rules of procedure.
6. Ontario, Class Proceedings Act, S.O. 1992, c.6 [hereinafter Ont. Act].
7. See ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS (Ministry
of the Attorney General 1982).
8. Id. at 117-45. These goals have been frequently cited with approval in
subsequent Canadian judgments, including a leading judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada. See Hollicks v. Toronto (City), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 (Can.).
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grievances that would otherwise remain unanswered. 9 Second, it led to
economies in the use of judicial resources.' 0 This was because, in the
absence of a class action remedy, members of the class would be obliged
to bring individual actions which, if the class was large enough, could
overwhelm judicial resources. 1' Third, the threat of a class action will
lead to behavioural modification by putative defendants who would not
be deterred by the threat of individual actions but would be deterred by
the possibility of a large damage award, quite possibly running into the
millions of dollars. 12 These class action goals have been frequently
reiterated by Canadian courts, in considering defendants' attempts to
have a class action dismissed before it could proceed to trial. However,
the advantages do not take into account some of the less attractive
features of class actions, the very features that have often persuaded
governments in other jurisdictions to reject the class action remedy. I
consider these objections in a later part of this presentation.

VI. PRECONDITIONS TO CERTIFICATIONS OF ACTION
There are some differences among the class action provisions of the
common law provinces and even greater differences between the Ontario
Act and the Quebec provisions. However, all the common law provinces
share in common the following five requirements a class plaintiff must
a certificate authorizing the plaintiff to
satisfy before a court will issue
3
proceed to trial of the action:'
1.
The plaintiff must have a cognizable cause of action.
2.
The members of the class must be identifiable.
3.
The claims of the class members must raise common
issues.
4.
A class action must be the 'preferable procedure' for the
resolution of the common issues.

9. ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 117-45.
10. Id.
11. This prediction has been corroborated by British experience since 2006. There,
the district courts were deluged with hundreds of actions by bank customers against
British banks following allegation by Which?, a consumer magazine, that the banks were
levying excessive charges for overdrafts and other bank services. See Banks' Profits
'f2.5bn a year'

From Overdraft Fees, WHICH?,

July 8,

2008, available at

http://www.which.co.uk/news/2008/07/banks-profits-25bn-a-year-from-overdraft-fees151247.jsp; see also Rachael Mulheron, Reform of Collective Redress in England and
Wales: A Perspective of Need, at 121 et seq. (2008) (research paper submitted to the Civil
Justice Council of England and Wales), available at http://www.civiljusticecouncil.
gov.uk/files/collective-redress.pdf.
12. See ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 7.
13. Ont. Act, s.5.
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The representative plaintiff is a person who (i) will fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the class, (ii) has
produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable
method of advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class
and notifying members of the class of the proceeding, and
(iii) does not have, on the common issues for the class, an
interest in conflict with the interests of other class
members.

Statistics show that, in practice, only about five percent of class actions
proceed to trial. The other actions are settled at an earlier stage, are
discontinued by the plaintiff, or are dismissed by the court. The heavy
lifting by the parties occurs during the precertification stage as the
defendant challenges one or more (and frequently all five) of the
preconditions to certification. This phase of the action may run for five
years or more because of the voluminous affidavit material filed by the
defendant, the complexities of the factual and legal issues, and the
frequency of appeals from the decision of the motion judge.14 A
conspicuous feature of the Canadian class action scene is the critical
supervisory role played by the courts at every phase of the proceedings.
VII. OPTING IN AND OPTING OUT; AND NATIONAL CLASS ACTIONS

All of the provincial legislation requires intraprovincial members of
a class who wish to be excluded from certification or from any settlement
of the action to opt out of the action or any proposed settlement; they are
not required to opt in before they can be considered to be members of the
class. This feature of Canadian class action law-highly controversial in

14. The practice in Ontario is for a judge to be assigned to a class action at the
beginning of the suit and to remain the judge of record for the remainder of the case.
Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co. is a good example of the litigiousness of class actions.
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 629, 2004 SCC 25 (Can.). The action was started in 1994 and was not
finally disposed of until 2007. In between there were numerous motions before the judge
of first instances, several appeals to the Ontario Court of Appeal, and two appeals to the
Supreme Court of Canada. The main issue in Garland was whether the defendant
utility's late payment penalties ("LPP") had breached section 347 of the Canadian
Criminal Code limiting maximum interest rates to 60 per cent per annum even though the
LPP had been approved by the Ontario Energy Board before it was introduced by
Consumers' Gas. The action was finally settled for about $22 million, half of which was
earmarked to cover counsel fees and disbursements. The other half, by agreement of the
parties and with the court's approval, was paid over, cy-pr~s, to a fund, "Out of the
Cold," that provided financial assistance to low income families who could not afford to
pay their winter heating bills. This cy-pr~s use of part of the settlement monies was
agreed upon between the parties because it would have been too expensive for
Consumers' Gas to calculate and remit the small amounts payable to its several million
customers.
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the United Kingdom and many parts of the European Union-was
regarded in the OLRC Report as fundamental to the viability of class
actions and has never been seriously questioned in Canada.
More controversial are the questions whether a Canadian province
also has the constitutional power to extend the opt-out rule to nonresidents of the province, in which the class action is started-in other
words, whether a province has the power to authorize a national class
action-and whether other provinces are obliged to recognize a class
action purporting to have extraprovincial reach. The British Columbia
Act provides' 5 that non-residents can only be included in an action if
they opt in. The Ontario and Manitoba courts have held 6 that nonresidents can be included on an opt-in basis, if there is a substantial
connection between the action and the province. In 2008,
a divided
7
Quebec Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion.'
An even more troubling issue-and one that has arisen with
increasing frequency in recent years-occurs where a class action
involving the same defendant is brought in more than one province.
Frequently counsel will agree among themselves regarding which of
them is to have carriage of the case, and in which province, and how
settlement negotiations are to be conducted and on what terms. Absent
such agreement, it remains unclear whether a class action in one province
will preclude the bringing of an action in another province. These issues
too remain to be resolved by the Supreme Court of Canada. In a
comprehensive report, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada has
recommended 18 the establishment of a national class action register so
that counsel and the courts can readily establish when a class action has
been started anywhere in Canada. However, the Report stopped short of
recommending the establishment of a multiprovincial judicial panel

15. B.C. Class Proceedings Act, SBC 1995, c. 21, s. 16(2) [hereinafter B.C. Act].
16. See e.g., Nantais v. Teletronic Pty., [1996] 28 O.R.3d 523 (Can.); Currie v.
McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd., [2005] 74 O.R.3d 321 (Can.); Ward v. Canada,
[2007] 220 Man. R.2d 224 (Can.).
17. Hocking v. Haziza and HSBC Bank Canada, [2008] QCCA 800 (Can.). In
Lepine v. Post Office, the Quebec Court of Appeal also affirmed a lower court decision
refusing to recognize an Ontario class action settlement purporting to include Quebec
members of the class but the decision was based on the alleged inadequacy of the notice
given the Quebec class members of the Ontario proceedings. Lepine v. Post Office,
[2007] QCA 97 (Can.). At this time of writing (November 2008), the Lepine case is on
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada but the Supreme Court's decision is not expected
till some time in 2009. See Janet Walker, Recognizing Multijurisdiction Class Action
Judgments within Canada: Key Questions-SuggestedAnswers, 46 CAN. Bus. L.J. 450
(2008).

18. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Report of the Committee on the National
Class and Related Interjurisdictional
Issues: Background, Analysis, and
Recommendations (2005).
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(similar to the Multidistrict Litigation panel system used by federal
courts in the US) to determine which province is to have carriage of a
class action. The national class action register is in course of being
implemented and Canadian judges are discussing among themselves the
feasibility of a multiprovincial judicial panel.
VIII. FORMS OF CLASS ACTION JUDGMENTS AND CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENTS

A frequent objection by defendants to a class action is that the costs
of ascertaining who are the members of the class, and the damages they
have suffered as a result of the defendant's conduct, will greatly exceed
any likely compensation payable to the members if the action is
successful. The provincial class action legislation provides the courts
with a variety of tools to address these and other issues. For example,
the court may render judgment in favour of the class on the issue of the
defendant's liability but require members of the class to bring individual
actions to prove the quantum of damages suffered by them.
Alternatively, the individual assessments may be referred for
determination by a court official or outside arbitrator. The court may
also award judgment in a lump sum and entitle members of the class to
make individual claims against the fund on a pro rata basis.' 9 The
legislation also authorizes the use statistical techniques to determine the
quantum of illicit gains made by a culpable defendant 2 and may make a
cy-pr~s award requiring the gain to be paid to a worthy cause where the
costs of identifying and distributing the gains among members of the
class would exceed any likely benefits to the class.2'
All the class action legislation provides that a settlement reached
between the parties has no legal effect unless and until it has been
approved by the court.22 Canadian courts take their adjudicative role
very seriously and will frequently write lengthy judgments to justify the
settlement agreed upon by the parties or requiring the parties to make
amendments to the agreement. Notice must also be given to members of
19. Ont. Act, ss.24-25.
20. Id. at s.23.
21. For example, in Consumers' Gas, cited supra note 14, the parties agreed that the
amount of the defendant's unlawful gain (approximately Can.$10 million) should be paid
to a fund providing indigent families with assistance in meeting their winter heating bills.
In Markson v. MBNA Canada Bank, [2007] O.J. 1684 (O.C.A. May 2, 2007), the Ontario

Court of Appeal approved the use of statistical techniques to determine how many of the
Bank's customers had paid bank charges that exceeded the ceiling permitted by section
347 of the Canadian Criminal Code. See also Cassano v. Toronto-Dominion Bank,
[2007] O.J. 4406 (O.C.A. Nov. 14, 2007) (strongly affirming the courts' flexible powers
in dealing with the remedial aspects of a successful action).
22. E.g., Ont. Act, s.29(2).
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the class entitling the members to opt out of the settlement or to file
objections to the terms of the settlement. 3 So far, however, Canadian
courts have not gone to the length of requiring an opinion from a third
party on the fairness of the settlement, although there is much to be said
for this prophylactic device.24
Closely related to class action settlements is the question of the
amount and payment of class action counsel's fees and disbursements.
The fees and disbursements may amount to a sizable share of the total
settlement figure. Individual class action members may only receive a
token amount, or they may only be entitled to free repair or replacement
of a defective part, or to a longer period of service where the service was
interrupted because of the defendant's fault. Typically, the class action
legislation does not spell out, or does not spell out fully, how counsel's
fee is to be determined and how the approach differs among the
provincial courts. In Ontario and the other provinces, it is common for
plaintiffs solicitor and the named plaintiff in the class action to enter
into a written fee and costs agreement before the action is initiated. In
the overwhelming number of cases, the representative plaintiff will lack
the means to pay the solicitor and would be unwilling to lend his name to
the action if the benefit of a successful action would largely accrue to the
other members of the class. Typically, all fees and costs agreements
require the court's approval for their effectiveness. 25 A distinguishing
feature of the statutory provisions applying to contingency fee
agreements is that they entitle the plaintiff s solicitor to apply to the court
to have the solicitor's "base fee" increased by a multiple to be applied to
the base fee ("multiplier").2 6 Multiplier applications are the norm and
have given rise to complex judgments in their own right.27 The purpose
of a multiplier award is to compensate the plaintiff's firm for the high
risks and uncertainty involved in agreeing to represent the plaintiff as

23. See id. at s.8(l).
24. In the case of settlements in other areas of the law involving infants or other
persons under a legal disability, Canadian courts have long required the approval of the
Public Guardian or other public official. There is nothing in the class action legislation
precluding a judge from requiring a fairness opinion from a third party. Additionally, it
is a little surprising that Canadian judges have not exercised this power where individual
class members have little to gain from the proposed settlement and have a negligible
incentive to appear on the settlement hearing to voice their objections.
25. See id. at ss.32-33. In practice, and for his own protection, the plaintiff's
solicitor will usually enter into a written fees and costs agreement with the named
plaintiff before the action is initiated. It is also common for the agreement to provide that
the solicitor will only be entitled to recover his fee and disbursements from the plaintiff if
the action is successful.
26. See e.g., id. at s.33(2).
27. A leading Ontario case is Gagne v. Silcorp Limited, [1998] 41 O.R.3d 417
(Can.).
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well as the long period of time that will often elapse before judgment is
rendered or the action is settled before trial. In large and complex class
action litigation, the approved counsel fee may run into the millions of
dollars, and this may give rise to the impression that class actions are a
feeding trough for hungry lawyers. The impression is largely unfounded.
It is especially so if one remembers that it may have taken five or more
years for the action to be settled or to come to trial and that counsel ran
the risk of not recovering any fee and not recovering the firm's
disbursements (usually very heavy) if the action was unsuccessful.28
IX. COSTS AGAINST UNSUCCESSFUL PLAINTIFF

Recovering costs against unsuccessful plaintiffs is an area where the
provinces have adopted different approaches. In Ontario, the basic class
action rule is that costs follow the event.2 9 This means that the
unsuccessful representative plaintiff may be exposed to very heavy costs,
possibly amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars, which, in most
cases, he cannot begin to absorb himself. 30 The Ontario Act provides
that the court may relieve the unsuccessful plaintiff from having to pay
costs if the class action was a test case, raised a novel point of law, or
involved a matter of public interest. 3 1 The British Columbia 32,
Saskatchewan 33 and Manitoba 34 Acts are more plaintiff-friendly and
provide that costs may only be awarded against the plaintiff if the action
was frivolous, and even then the award is discretionary. Plaintiffs'
28. See e.g., Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629 (Can.). In the
Consumers' Gas case, the total settlement amount approved by the court was approx $22
million, of which plaintiffs counsel received approx $12 million to cover counsel's fees
and disbursements over the fifteen year litigation period. This is not an extravagant
amount by any measure.
29. See Ont. Act, s.31.
30. Not all representative plaintiffs are impecunious. In the Kerr v. Danier Leather
Inc. litigation, the Ontario Court of Appeal refused to relieve the plaintiff from having to
pay the costs of the unsuccessful action, reputed to amount to a million dollars or more,
because the plaintiff had deep pockets and was a major shareholder in the defendant
company. [2005] 77 O.R.3d 321 (Can.). The Supreme Court of Canada upheld this
aspect of the Court of Appeal's judgment as well, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 331, 2007 SCC 44
(Can.), and Justice Binnie, writing the Court's opinion, went out of his way to point out
that the plaintiff had engaged in a calculated gamble in starting the class action, and that
it was therefore not unfair to penalize the plaintiff. Aside from such special cases as
Danier Leather, there is a point of view, which the writer shares, that counsel has a duty
to warn the representative plaintiff of the costs risk if the action is unsuccessful. Some
observers go further and argue that plaintiffs counsel has an obligation to indemnify the
plaintiff against a costs award where counsel has selected the representative plaintiff in
the case.
31. SeeOnt. Act, s.31(1).
32. See Class Proceedings Act, 1995 S.B.C., ch.21.
33. See The Class Actions Act, 2001 S.S., ch. 21.
34. See The Class Proceedings Act, 2002 S.M., ch. 130.
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counsel take the position that this is the right approach since plaintiffs
counsel and, in some cases the plaintiff himself, have to dig deeply into
their pockets to keep the class action going without running the
additional risk of having to indemnify the defendant if the action is
unsuccessful. The Quebec class action law has finessed the problem in a
unique way. It allows a successful defendant to recover costs but only on
the scale of costs approved in the small claims division of the Quebec
Court.35
X.

CLASS ACTION FUNDING

In the overwhelming number of class actions, the representative
plaintiff is in no better position to fund the action than he is in a position
to absorb the costs of an unsuccessful action. Only two of the provinces,
Ontario and Quebec, have meaningfully addressed the issue in Canada,
although the Quebec approach is the more ambitious of the two. 36 In
Ontario, the provincial government established a class proceedings fund
about the time the CPA came into effect and contributed the sum of five
million dollars to establish the fund.37 The Ontario legislation also
established a board, whose members are appointed by the Law
Foundation of Canada, to administer the fund and to consider
applications from plaintiffs counsel for financial support.38 The support

is only available to cover disbursements, not any part of counsel's fees.39
The risk of non-payment of fees remains with counsel. If the Fund
agrees to support the litigation and the action is unsuccessful, the
defendant is entitled to apply to the Fund for recovery of the defendant's
costs.4 0 If the action is successful, the plaintiff will be required to repay
the contribution to the plaintiffs costs made by the Fund. In addition,
the Fund will be entitled to receive ten percent of the judgment awarded
in favour of the class. In practice, the Ontario provisions have not had
much impact on the funding of class actions, and this for two reasons.
First, most plaintiffs' counsel view the Fund as seriously underfunded
given the number of class actions in progress at any time. Because of
this feature, counsel do not deem it worth while to expend the time
necessary to satisfy the administrators' demanding requirements to
qualify for funding assistance. The second reason is that most counsel
take the position that, if they are expected to absorb the risk of non35. See An Act Respecting the Class Action, 2000 R.S.Q., c. R-2.1, Title II.
36. See Law Society Amendment Act (Class Proceedings Funding), 1992 S.O., c. L
8; see also An Act Respecting the Class Action, supra note 35.
37. See Law Society Amendment Act, supra note 36, at s.59.1(1).
38. See id. at ss.55.3, 59.1, 59.2.
39. See id. at s.59.1(2).
40. See id. at s.59.4(1).
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payment of their fees if the action is unsuccessful, they might as well
continue to finance the disbursements as well.
In Quebec, the scope of the Fonds d'aide aux recours collectiffs
("Fonds") provided for under the province's class actions law, 4 1 is
significantly more ambitious in scope than the Ontario plan. The Fonds
is an ongoing financial responsibility of the Quebec government and, if
the application is granted, the financial assistance will cover, up to the
agreed amount, the plaintiffs attorney fees and disbursements (including
the fees of expert witnesses) as well as other expenses related to the
preparation of or bringing of the case.4 2 Therefore, the Quebec
government plays an active financial role in supporting class actions.
XI.

OTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO CLASS ACTIONS

Apart from the certification requirements and the financial
challenges facing plaintiffs counsel, there are other obstacles that stand
in the way of Canadian class actions. Two are of particular importance.
The first is the proliferating use of arbitration clauses in consumer
agreements obliging consumers to resort to arbitration to settle any
disputes and prohibiting recourse to class actions. The validity and
fairness of such arbitration provisions in consumer agreements has
triggered an enormous volume of litigation and scholarly discussion in
the United States. So far as Canada is concerned, the position is
unsettled. Before legislation was introduced to resolve the issue, the
majority of Ontario courts held that the arbitration provisions were
The Ontario
contrary to public policy and were unenforceable.
government clarified the position in 2005 by adopting an amendment to
the province's Consumer Protection Act 43 invalidating the effectiveness
of such arbitration provisions. The British Columbia courts have
adopted a more nuanced position and have held that the existence of
arbitration provisions in the parties' agreement is merely another factor
to be taken into consideration by the court in determining whether a class
action is the preferable procedure for handling the plaintiff's complaint.44
These relatively tranquil waters were deeply disturbed by the
Supreme Court of Canada's holding, in a divided opinion, in Union des

41. See An Act Respecting the Class Action, supra note 35, at Title II.
42. See id. at art. 29; see also Fonds d'aide aux recours collectifs, Rapports annuel
2006-07,
available at http://canlii.org/qc/laws/regu/r-2.1 r.4/20060718/whole.html
(providing further details about the operation of the Quebec plan).
43. Stat. Ont. 2004, c.19, s.4, amending Stat. Ont. 2002, c.30, Sched. A.
44. Mackinnon v. National Money Mart Co., [2004] B.C.L.R.2d (Can.).
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consommateurs v. Dell Computers Corp.45 that arbitration provisions in
consumer agreements were not contrary to the public interest or the
provisions of Quebec's Code civil. The majority judgment also held that,
in any event, any objections by the consumer about the enforceability of
the arbitration clause had to be raised before the arbitrator and could not
be entertained by the courts. The Supreme Court's decision generated a
lot of commentary,4 6 much of it critical. Remarkably, so far as Quebec
itself was concerned, the decision itself was dead on arrival because the
Quebec Assembly had passed an amendment on the day argument on the
case opened in the Supreme Court invalidating mandatory consumer
arbitration provisions. However, the Dell decision may continue to
influence common law courts in those provinces that have not enacted
invalidating provisions.4 7
The other impediments facing consumer class actions are less of an
immediate threat but constitute a greater long term danger. This 'threat'
is that federal and provincial legislation will severely restrict or even
outlaw certain types of class actions against governments. Many of the
class actions launched over the past fifteen years have been against the
several levels of government-federal, provincial and municipalalleging breach of the defendants' common law duties of care or
statutory obligations to the same effect, or holding a government entity
vicariously liable for wrongs committed by agents acting on behalf of the
governmental agency. In several of the cases, the damages claimed to
have been suffered by members of the class have run into a billion
dollars or more.
The surprise is that the federal and provincial
governments have not acted earlier to restrain such class actions or to
provide alternative means for settling them. The precedents certainly
exist where federal and provincial governments have adopted legislation,
45. Union des consommateurs v. Dell Computers Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007
SCC 34 (Can.). The Court released a companion decision to the same effect and on the
same day in Muroff v. Rogers Wireless Inc., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 921, 2007 SCC 35 (Can.).
46. See e.g., Shelley McGill, The Conflict Between Consumer Class Actions and
Contractual Arbitration Clauses, 43 CAN. Bus. L.J. 359 (2006); Shelley McGill,
Consumer Arbitration and Class Actions: The impact of Dell Computer Corp. v. Union

des consommateurs, 45 CAN. Bus L.J. 334 (2007).
47. In British Columbia, two trial courts have held that the Supreme Court's decision
is not binding on British Columbia courts because of important differences in the class
action and commercial arbitration legislation of Quebec and British Columbia. See
Mackinnon v. National Money Mart Co., [2008] 293 D.L.R.4th 478; Seidel v. Telus
Communications Inc., [2008] B.C.J. 1347 (B.C.S.C. July 16, 2008) (Masuhara, J.). Both
judgments are under appeal. The Ontario Court of Appeal has reached the same
conclusion as the British Columbia courts though on somewhat different grounds. See
Smith Estate v. National Mart Co., [2008] 92 O.R.3d 224 (O.C.A.) (As previously noted,
a 2005 amendment to the Ontario Consumer Protection Act invalidated mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer agreements. The Ontario actions in Mackinnon, supra,
involved proceedings that were commenced before 2005.).
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and in some cases made it retroactive, 48 outlawing individual and
collective claims of various kinds. It may be that the difference between
those cases and the cases that have triggered class actions is that the
latter have usually involved claims for personal injuries or psychological
harm, 49 or of physical damage to the class members' property, 50 and that
governments were concerned about the public backlash if they were
perceived to be shirking their responsibilities. The difference of course
between claims against governments and class action claims against
profit making enterprises is that the latter carry insurance or can selfinsure against claims for defective products and services and, if the
worse comes to the worst, can seek protection under Canada's
bankruptcy legislation. Governmental services are provided on a nonprofit basis for the public benefit and, unless the defendant governmental
agency is separately incorporated, any claims that are settled must
ultimately be paid for by all taxpayers. 51
XII. THE FUTURE OF CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA
No great controversy surrounded the introduction of class action
legislation in Canada in the 1990s or more recently, and there is no
visible pressure by business groups or government agencies to dismantle
the legislation or to make radical changes. There may be a variety of
reasons for this acquiescence. The few cases that have gone to trial have
not involved juries and the defendants have not faced the threat of huge
damage awards common in some parts of the United States.
Theoretically, punitive damages are claimable in Canadian class actions,

48. See e.g., Ont., Estate Administration Tax Act 1998 (precluding recovery of
unlawfully imposed probation fees); see also Wolfe D. Goodman, Unlawful Taxes and
the Supreme Court's Decision in Eurig, 31 CAN. Bus. L.J. 291, 298 (1999); Authorson v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2007] 86 O.R.3d 321 (O.C.A.) (upholding validity of
amendments to the federal Department of Veterans Affairs Act retroactively precluding
actions against the Department for breach of its fiduciary duties in failing to invest
properly veterans' pension funds under its administration).
49. The hepatitis infected blood cases brought against the federal and provincial
governments in the early 1990s fall into this category. So do the claims brought against
the federal government for physical and sexual abuse suffered by native students at
residential schools established by the federal government in the last century, though the
schools themselves were run by various Christian denominations or independent
contractors retained by the government.
50. As in the class action brought against the federal government by Canadian cattle
farmers alleging they suffered heavy losses because the federal government negligently
admitted into Canada British cattle suffering from the 'mad cow' disease.
5 1. There are exceptions, but for the most part it is not usual in Canada for
government departments and agencies to be separately incorporated-why not is unclear
since conferment of corporate personality on a department or agency would be quite
simple.
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as they may be claimed in other civil actions,52 but apparently there is no
reported case of punitive damages being awarded in a class action
context. Again, as previously noted, Canadian judges have taken very
seriously their roles as gatekeepers to screen out frivolous, extravagant,
or unwieldy claims with the result that perhaps less than half of the class
actions have reached the certification stage.53 Yet another reason is that
the deep pockets of defendants have enabled them to put up a stiff fight
and either to defeat the claims entirely or to settle them on an acceptable
basis. No doubt, Canadian businesses and governments would prefer not
to be encumbered with class actions. I suspect, however, they have
sensibly concluded that Canadian public opinion would not tolerate
repeal of the legislation and that the average voter views the legislation
as an important bulwark by the "little guy" against the overweening
power of big business and big government.
XIII. WHAT CAN OTHER COUNTRIES LEARN FROM THE CANADIAN
EXPERIENCE?

I offer the following list:
1.
For the reasons explained in the last section, class actions
to address mass wrongs, at least as structured in Canada,
are not the unmitigated evil they are often perceived to be
in continental Europe (though surely not in all EU
countries) or the United Kingdom. Class actions, coupled
with contingent fees for the lawyers who initiate them, are
not an ideal solution but they are the second best solution
if governments are unable or unwilling to absorb the costs
of other remedial vehicles.
2.
Adoption of the opting-out principle for the efficient
conduct of class actions is unavoidable if class actions are
to achieve optimal results.54 Traditional objections in
Europe to the opting out approach are not persuasive and

52.
53.

Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 2002 SCC 18 (Can.).
Ward Branch, at paragraphs 4.41950 et seq. of ClassActions in Canada (a loose

leaf service published by Canada Law), cites the following statistics. In Quebec, as of the
end of 2007, there were 872 motions for certification and 399 certification decisions.
Certification was granted in 231 cases, 58 actions were tried on their merits and 36
judgments were rendered in the plaintiffs' favour. With respect to Ontario, as of
February 2008, there had been 224 certification hearings. Of 126 contested certification
hearings, 74 were certified after the hearing. Another 96 certification orders were issued
by consent. Twelve cases were settled, wholly or partially, after certification. Five cases
were determined on their merits and 4-5 cases were dismissed.
54. Professor Mulheron, supra note 11, has shown this convincingly with respect to
the effect of Group Litigation Orders ("GLOs") in England and the restriction of GLOs to
litigants who have opted in.
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have more to do with objections to an entrepreneurial
litigation culture than with the establishment of effective
means to remedy mass wrongs. Judicial oversight of class
actions can, and should be able to, avoid abuses linked to
use of the opting out rule and other class action abuses.
A class action system, precluding the use of juries and the
availability of punitive damages, can be implemented and
avoid the abuses associated with US class action practices.
Also, very reputable lawyers can be attracted to act as
plaintiffs' counsel in class actions. Based on the Canadian
experience, the common complaint that plaintiffs' lawyers
are largely driven by greed is unwarranted. 55 Defendant
companies and governments can mitigate the burden and
costs of class actions by investigating and offering prompt
redress when substantiated complaints first come to light,
e.g., reversing excessive banking charges, correcting false
product claims, and appointing mediators to assess claims
and recommend suitable settlements. However, allowing
defendants ex ante to deny consumer plaintiffs the right to
sue in the regular courts is not an appropriate policy.
The question whether, and to what extent, governments
should be exposed to class actions involving large
pecuniary claims requires further investigation. So should
be the issue whether a ceiling should be imposed on the
amount of recoverable damages where claims are made
against governments.

XIV. CONCLUSION

In law, as in other spheres of public policy, difficult choices often
have to be made between competing values. In the area of mass wrongs
against consumers, the choice is between governments doing too little
and allowing the harm to go without a remedy or allowing carefully
regulated class actions under court supervision to bridge at least part of
the gap. I believe Canadian experience supports the latter choice.

55. Note also the common belief in Canada that defendants' lawyers in class actions
do at least as well financially as plaintiffs' lawyers, and that, unlike plaintiffs' lawyers,
they don't have to worry about recovering their fees!

